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The paper argues that the Greek debt crisis, as well as those of other Southern European 
countries and Ireland, has to be seen in macroeconomic context. The sum of the public sector 
balance, the (domestic) private sector balance and the current account deficit (or equivalently: 
the capital inflows) has to add up to zero. By implication in a country that has a current 
account deficit either the private sector or the public sector has to run a deficit. Therefore the 
peripheral countries can only solve their public debt problems if there is a change in German 
current account surpluses. The paper explores the implications of this for wage policy in the 
euro zone. 
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In May 2010 a crisis of the Euro system was triggered by a sovereign debt crisis of Greece. A 
EU and IMF rescue package came with conditionality of extensive austerity measures. Still, in 
December 2010 a sovereign debt crisis erupted in Ireland and at the time of writing (Jan 2011) 
there is mounting concern that Portugal, Spain and Italy might face similar crises. In reaction 
to the crisis the EU intends to tighten fiscal policy rules across the Euro zone. This is based on 
the interpretation of the Greek crisis as resulting from a lack of fiscal discipline. This paper 
argues that this is wrong analysis and leads to wrong policy conclusions. The Greek debt 
crisis (as well as those of other Southern European countries and Ireland) has to be seen in 
macroeconomic context.  
 
The Greek debt crisis is often presented as a result of lack of fiscal discipline. There is some 
obvious truth in this as Greek deficits were higher than those of other Euro area countries. On 
the other hand, the fact that other peripheral countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain)
2 are 
experiencing similar crises suggest that a more general mechanism is at work. Indeed, we will 
argue, German export surpluses are a critical part of the story. A basic macroeconomic 
account identity states that the sum of the public sector balance, the (domestic) private sector 
balance and the current account deficit (or equivalently: the capital inflows) has to add up to 
zero. By implication, in a country that has a current account deficit either the private sector or 
the public sector has to run a deficit. Germany has pursued a policy of aggressive wage 
restraint resulting in large current account surpluses. German gains in competitiveness (since 
the introduction of the Euro) have not been founded on superi or technological performance, 
but on more effective wage suppression. Germany's current account surpluses are some other 
countries‟ current account deficits (and capital inflows). In other words, in some countries 
(indeed  most  of  this  is  going  on  within  the  Euro  zone)  some  economic  sectors  have  to 
increase their obligations to Germany: in Greece that was primarily the public sector, whereas 
in Spain it was the household sector. Simply put, German wage suppression rather than fiscal 
                                                 
1 This paper has been presented at the conference  Economic policy: in search of an  alternative paradigm, 
Middlesex University, Dec. 2010. The author is grateful to the participants at the conference, Andrea Ingianni 
and an anonymous referee for comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2 These countries are now sometimes referred to as the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). We 
use the term „Southern European periphery‟ or (old) „peripheral Europe‟ to refer to this group of countries. The 
new periphery, i.e. the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, are not covered in our discussion and will only 
be mentioned occasionally for purposes of clarification. 5 
profligacy is at root of the crisis of the Euro system (see Lapavitsas et al 2010a, 2010b for 
similar  and  Wyplosz  (2010)  for  an  opposing  analysis).  Europe  needs  a  set  of  economic 
institutions and policy rules that addresses such imbalances and their underlying mechanisms. 
 
The  paper  argues  that  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  in  the  European  periphery  has  laid  bare 
fundamental  flaws  in  the  architecture  of  the  Euro  system.  The  present  economic  policy 
package of the Euro zone consists of (1) a centralized and independent monetary policy aimed 
at price stability; (2) for practical purposes non-existing central fiscal policy; (3) national 
fiscal policies that are aimed at balanced budgets (in the medium term) and are severely 
restricted by the SGP (Stability and Growth Pact); (4) wage policy is hardly recognized as a 
policy area. This policy mix effectively institutionalizes the Monetarist vision of economic 
policy:  a passive state  aiming  at  price stability and  an overwhelming  trust  in  the market 
mechanism that presupposes, firstly, that wage are very flexible, and, secondly, that wage 
flexibility leads to full employment and to balanced current accounts. Neither long-lasting 
unemployment nor financial crises are supposed to occur in this view. In fact this policy 
setting has led to a mediocre economic performance, a declining wage share, rising current 
account imbalances - and eventually a sovereign debt crisis. 
 
For the medium term, the Euro zone needs a policy setting that prevents long-lasting current 
account imbalances, guarantees full employment and an equitable distribution of income. This 
requires a re-writing of the Euro area rule book. We argue that an active coordination of wage 
policy has to be at the centre of a new policy mix. This requires institution building and a very 
different role for labour unions in economic policy making. Wage policy has to ensure that 
wages grow with (national) productivity growth, that wage growth is consistent with (properly 
defined)  price  stability  (on  the  European  average),  and  with  sustainable  current  account 
positions within the Euro zone. This implies that wages have to grow at substantially higher 
rates in Germany than in the deficit countries. If Greece, Spain and other countries are not to 
be pushed into severe deflation, this would imply inflation rates in the range of 5-8%. Overall 
the Euro area inflation target will have to be revised upwards. 
 
One clarification on the scope of the paper is necessary. This paper will not try to evaluate the 
merits of a debt default (or restructuring) as several authors have recently argued (Lapavitsas 
2010b, Buiter and Rahbari 2010). Nor will we discuss whether Greece and other countries of 
the periphery should leave the Euro and devalue. Rather this paper analyses the sovereign 6 
debt crisis of the (old) European periphery as a crisis of the Euro system and explores the 
implications  for  economic  policy  in  the  Euro  area.  In  other  words,  our  question  is,  how 
economic policy and wage policy have to look in order to make the Euro system work. Debt 
restructuring may be useful (or even unavoidable), but, so the argument of this paper, without 
a structural change in European (in particular: German) wage policy similar crises are bound 
the reoccur in the future. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the macroeconomic policy regime in the 
Euro zone and highlights early Keynesian criticisms of it. Section 3 situates developments in 
the EU within the finance-dominated accumulation regime and analyzes how two different 
growth models emerged. Section 4 discusses the origins and the development of the crisis that 
culminated (for now) in the Greek debt crisis. Section 5 revisits the policy regime in the EU 
and calls for a fundamental reform, highlighting in particular the need to rethink the role of 
wage policy, which is elaborated on in section 6. Section 7 comments on the actual recent 
developments in economic policy and section 8 concludes. 
 
2 The EU policy regime 
 
The economic policy mix in the Euro zone is enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. 
It can be summarized as follows: First, fiscal policy is essentially national policy. The EU 
budget,  restricted  in  size  (to  2%  of  GDP)  and  too  small  (and  too  inflexible)  to  serve  a 
macroeconomic  function  such  as  providing  an  expansionary  stimulus  in  the  face  of 
(symmetric) adverse shocks. Second, national fiscal policies are restricted in the short term as 
the budget deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP (except in severe recessions) and they must 
aim at a balanced budget in the medium term. Third, monetary policy is centralized and is 
effectively inflation targeting, with the ECB independently having decided that the inflation 
target  close  to  or  below  2%.  Forth,  financial  markets  are  liberalized,  internally  as  well 
externally, that is, the EU foregoes any instruments of controlling credit growth credit or 
allocating  credit.  Fifth,  there  is  a  no  bailout  clause,  stating  that  neither  other  national 
governments nor the ECB will support individual countries which are facing problems in 
financing themselves.
3 Sixth, labour markets are supposed to be flexible. This is an essential 
part of the arrangement as the EU‟s policy regime essentially hinges on labour market to 
respond  flexibly,  efficiently  and  quickly  to  symmetric  as  well  as  to  asymmetric  shocks 
                                                 
3 Buiter and Rahbari (2010) offer an interesting discussion on what the bail out clause precisely states. 7 
because much of the traditional national means of dampening shocks such as exchange rate 
policy, (national) monetary policy or fiscal policy have been entirely given up or severely 
restricted. 
 
The EU policy package is characterized by a strong believe in the efficiency and self-healing 
properties of the market system and a strong distrust against state activity. From the very 
beginning Keynesian economists criticized its design (Arestis et al 2001, Arestis and Sawyer 
2004, Huffschmied 2005, Euromemo Group (2010), Flassbeck and Spiecker 2005, Hein and 
Truger 2004, 2005). First, there is an excessive reliance on labour market flexibility in the 
adjustment to symmetric as well as to asymmetric shocks. This goes back to the old debates 
between Keynes and the classics (Pigou), where Keynesians have argued that labour markets 
are complex social institutions and wages have social norm aspects that makes them unlikely 
to  react  flexibly  in  the  face  of  unemployment.  And  even  if  they  did,  the  effect  is  not 
necessarily beneficial (see Stockhammer 2011a, 2011b as modern reformulations). The EU 
would thus be subject to prolonged unemployment. Second, the EU policy system would 
create a deflationary bias. In the case of divergences within the EU, with some countries 
running trade deficits and others running trade surpluses, the burden of adjustment effectively 
falls to the country with trade deficits. The adjustment of the surplus countries is inflationary 
(to  stimulate  their  demand  and  imports  and  to  increase  their  unit  costs),  whereas  the 
adjustment of the deficit countries is deflationary as they have to dampen demand (to decrease 
imports)  and  lower  their  prices  and  wages  (to  restore  competitiveness).  As  the  ECB  is 
committed  to  a  low  inflation  target  an  inflationary  adjustment  is  unlikely  and  would  be 
counteracted by monetary policy. Third, the exclusive reliance on wages as the adjusting 
variable will create a downward pressure on wages. With macroeconomic policy having a 
deflationary bias and most  of the traditional economic policy instruments  constrained the 
relatively open EU member states would be prone to pursue wage restraint as a means of 
competitive (real) devaluation. Forth, there was no Plan B in case of a serious crisis. The 
effectiveness of monetary policy is limited in the case of severe crisis, but fiscal policy is 
limited by design in the EU. Moreover, the no bailout clause would hamper fiscal policy in 
times  of  severe  crisis  exactly  at  the  time  when  countries  would  be  unable  to  use  either 
monetary or exchange rate policies. The EU policy package simply assumed that such a crisis 
would not occur. 
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With  hindsight  all  these  criticisms  have  been  vindicated.  First,  the  overall  economic 
performance of the EMU countries has been disappointing, with growth rates below those of 
previous decades, which is of course in outright contradiction to the European Commission‟s 
promise of higher growth due to, first, the Single Market, and, later EMU. Second, there has 
been  a  strong  decline  in  the  wage  share.  Third,  there  has  been  a  dangerous  build  up  of 
imbalances within the Euro zone since the introduction of the Euro. The following sections 
will contextualize these imbalances in global transformations of capitalism and explain how 
they contributed to the crisis of the Euro system in the 2010. 
 
3  A  finance-dominated  accumulation  regime  with  export-led  and  credit-led  growth 
models 
 
The  developments  within  the  Euro  zone  form  part  of  a  global  pattern,  it  is  thus  worth 
discussing broader developments before continuing our analysis of the Euro zone. The shift in 
economic policy that occurred in the early 1980s, often called Neoliberalism, lead to welfare 
state retrenchment and to the deregulation of the financial sector, both within countries and as 
regards international capital flows (Glyn 2005, Harvey 2004). Stockhammer (2010b) analyses 
these  in  term  of  a  neoliberal  mode  of  regulation  that  gave  rise  to  a  finance-dominated 
accumulation  regime.  Finance  has  critically  shaped  macroeconomic  pattern:  in  many 
countries  debt  levels  have  risen  dramatically;  corporate  governance  structures  have  been 
transformed  by  institutional  investors;  international  capital  flows  have  grown  much  more 
rapidly than „real‟ economic activity; an increasing share of profits is appropriated as financial 
profits and financial crises have become more frequent (Stockhammer 2010a). While these 
tendencies  can  be  observed  in  all  countries,  there  has  been  a  notable  divergence  across 
countries in terms of the driving force of growth, which is reflected in the pattern of demand. 
Stockhammer (2010b) thus argues that a credit-led and an export-led growth model have 
emerged (see Table 1). In a first group of countries credit-financed consumption growth and 
residential investment have become the key source of demand growth. The most prominent 
example of this is of course the USA. On a global scale, these countries have provided the 
main source of  growth  and these  countries  have typically run substantial  current  account 
deficits. A second group of countries has, for various reasons not experienced an equally 
strong  rise in  household debt  and  consumption (in the 1990s  and 2000s). Some of these 
countries  increasingly  relied  on  exports  as  the  main  growth  engine,  Germany,  Japan  and 
China being the most prominent and important examples. As this list makes clear, the routes 9 
to  export-led  growth  are  quite  different:  in  Germany  export  orientation  has  been  a 
characteristic of the post-war economy; Japan experienced its own phase of credit-led growth 
in the 1980 that turned sour in 1990s; in China (and other South East Asian countries) it is 
part of industrial development strategy, and in part a reaction to the Asian financial crisis 
which lead to a desire to build up foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
To what extent do these broad categories fit the European case? Table 2 summarizes the 
increase of household debt (as % of GDP) over the periods 2000-04 and 2000-08 (for some 
countries no data are available for this longer period). Here as in the following we look at 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands as the core countries and Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy 
and  Ireland  as  the  Southern  periphery.
4  While household debt is falling in Germany and 
moderately increasing in Austria, it is dramatically increasing in the Southern periphery, with 
all countries well above the Euro (12) area average. In the Netherlands household debt 
increases rapidly as well, though not as fast as in Ireland and Spain. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 gives the current account position (as % of GDP) in the year 2007, i.e. right before the 
crisis. This shows substantial current account surpluses in Germany and the Netherlands and a 
moderate one in Austria; whereas all the peripheral countries show substantial current account 
deficits with Greece and Portugal above 8%, with Italy and Ireland more moderate.
5 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
One  important  determinant  of  the  current  account  positions  is  the  development  of 
competitiveness. Table 4 thus summarizes the development of nominal unit labour costs 
(ULC) in EU countries. Germany and Austria have  increases of ULC well below the Euro 
                                                 
4 Other Euro member states, most notably France, are implicitly treated as intermediate cases. 
5 The current account consists of the net exports of goods and services and the factor incomes. It turns out that 
there are non-trivial differences between the current account positions and net export positions. The change is 
most dramatic for Ireland, for which the current account position is negative (-2%), but net exports are strongly 
positive (10% of GDP). In the case of Ireland this reflect repatriated profits of more than 10% of GDP 10 
area average (and the Netherlands slightly above), whereas the peripheral countries all show 
increases well above the EU average. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Thus there is evidence of quite different developments in the core and the peripheral countries 
and the characterization as the Germany and Austria as export-led and the peripheral countries 
as finance-led seems to be broadly consistent with the data. Admittedly, the Netherlands don‟t 
fit easily and could, in our framework be characterized as export-led as well as finance-led. 
Moreover, we have not included some intermediate cases, namely France, in our analysis. 
Given our focus on the Euro zone, we have not investigated the Central and Eastern European 
countries, i.e. the new periphery.
6 
 
These different growth models are not antithetical to the process of financialization, but 
intrinsically linked on two levels. First, financial globalization is an important dimension of 
financialization. It has allowed countries to run current account deficits larger in volume and 
over longer time periods than under the Bretton Woods system. International imbalances are 
thus a consequence of financialization. Second, trade imbalances have fuelled credit growth 
and bubbles in the credit -led economies as the current account surpluses of the export -led 
economies were flowing to credit-led economies and providing further liquidity. 
 
The emergence of imbalances within the Euro system thus to some extent mirrors a regime of 
accumulation that is characterized by global imbalances. However, the European experience 
adds several specific twists. First, while on a global scale, the leading economies have been 
the credit-led economies, namely the USA and the UK; in Europe the core economies, namely 
Germany  (and  its  small  cousins),  have  been  export -led  while  the  peripheral,  Southern 
European economies have become credit -led. (Adding the new, Eastern periphery further 
complicates the picture, as many of these countries are characterized by a strong export  
orientation as well as by rapid increases in household debt, albeit from low starting levels). 
Second, the Euro zone provided a direct mechanism for financialization as the common 
                                                 
6 The CEEC form an interesting group in our framework, or to be more precise: two groups. The Baltic states 
and Romania and Bulgaria would qualify as credit-led (however this characterization runs the danger of 
understating the extent of (dependent) industrialization that has occurred in these countries), whereas the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Hungary are closer to an export-led model. 11 
currency reduced interest rates in the Southern European countries and financial integration 
by way of liberalization was explicit policy of the European Commission. Third, as discussed 
below,  EMU  (Economic  and  Monetary  Unification)  provided  a  unique  set  of  policy 
constraints. 
 
4 The crisis 
 
When the Greek crisis culminated in May 2010 it was foremost conceived as a fiscal crisis. 
While Greek manipulation of government debt data clearly contributed to this perception, 
interpreting  the  crisis  as  a  government  debt  problem  misses  its  significance  on  several 
accounts. It neglects that markets‟ concern about government debt came after confidence had 
been shaken in private debt markets and after governments had stabilized these. But it also 
misses that the Greek crisis is at the same time a crisis of European private financial markets 
and institutions. To appreciate both aspects, let us rehearse the development of the crisis. 
 
The financial crisis broke out in spring 2007 in the derivative markets of a small segment of 
the US mortgage market, the so-called subprime market. Banks in the USA had increasingly 
issued credit to low quality borrowers and refinanced themselves by packaging and selling 
these loans. This was attractive to banks and investors on the assumption that house prices 
would keep rising. When house prices started falling, a sophisticated financial machinery 
came down and with it the credit-led growth model of the USA. Household debt had been 
rising rapidly based on rising house prices and expected further rises. Despite the prominence 
of the subprime market in debates and news coverage at the time, however, already at the 
early stages it was clear (IMF 2008, Table 1.1) that in terms of the volume of losses prime 
mortgages and commercial property were more important than subprime. 
 
The subprime crisis turned into a fully blown financial crisis in September 2008 after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Private financial markets froze and even the major financial 
institutions had problems in raising short-term liquidity. Within a matter of days it became 
clear that if the private sector were left on its own, this would result in cascade of further 
failures. As a consequence a series of government interventions, historically unprecedented in 
its scale took place to stabilize financial markets. Major banks were recapitalized by the state 
and interbank markets were guaranteed.  
 12 
In  fall  2008  the  real  effects  of  the  crisis  became  apparent.  Outside  the  USA  the  „real‟ 
economic activity had hardly been impacted upon, but now all major economies took a nose 
dive  into  the  deepest  recession  since  the  1930s.  In  this  phase  government  deficits  (or 
liabilities) increased, but this was widely welcome by markets. In the course of 2009 the 
recession deepened, but panic on financial markets receded.   
 
In late 2009 and early 2010, as the recession seemed to bottom out, but as the scale of fiscal 
costs of the crisis became clear financial market increasingly started worrying about sovereign 
debt. Markets increasingly turned against those who had saved them. The weakest link among 
the (developed) states  (leaving aside  Iceland) turned out  to  be Greece,  which had higher 
budget  deficits  than  other  countries  (though  not  much  higher  than  the  US  or  the  UK). 
Hungary, the Baltic states and Pakistan had already had to turn to the IMF, but the Greek 
situation was unique in that its policy options were constrained through Euro membership: it 
could not devalue and it did not have central bank of its own. But as if to illustrate that this 
was not primarily a Greek crisis but a Euro system crisis, other Southern peripheral countries 
came  also  under  pressure.  Things  stabilized  only  after  the  European  Financial  Stability 
Facility (EFSF) had been set up and Greek government debt refinancing had effectively been 
taking off markets for three years. 
 
But  the  Greek  sovereign  debt  crisis  was  at  the  same  time  a  crisis  for  the  private  sector. 
Government debt and private bank solvency have become intrinsically linked. It is instructive 
to quote from ECB‟s Monthly Bulletin from June 2010: 
 
“on 6-7 May tensions in the sovereign debt markets of some euro area countries spread to 
other segments of the financial markets. Volatility in the financial markets increased sharply 
and liquidity conditions deteriorated significantly not only in sovereign bond markets, but also 
and  to  a  critical  degree  in  the  money  markets.  Transactions  within  the  interbank  market 
declined  rapidly  and  uncertainty  among  banks  about  counterparties‟  creditworthiness 
increased.” (ECB 2010, 41) 
 
As a consequence there were “heightened concerns about the probability of default of some 
European financial institutions. Indeed, the probability of a simultaneous default of two or 
more euro area large and complex banking groups, (...) rose sharply on 7 May, reaching 
values higher than in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers.” (ECB 2010, 38-39) 13 
 
In other words, the Greek crisis was Europe‟s Lehman moment. Saving Greece was necessary 
to  keep  European  banks  afloat.  However,  it  was  not  sufficient.  Half  a  year  later  another 
country experienced a sovereign debt crisis: Ireland. The background was different in that the 
increase in public debt in the Irish case was directly linked to the financial crisis and a real 
estate bubble. Again, the EFSF and the IMF came to the rescue. And again it was a rescue of 
the European banks more than a rescue of the Irish people (Eichengreen 2010). 
 
5 The macroeconomics of rebalancing 
 
Europe faces two challenges: in the short run it has to stabilize fragile economies and their 
financial  sectors  and  in  the  medium  term  it  has  to  rebalance  its  internal  current  account 
positions. The focus of this paper is on the medium-term challenge. Simply put, the problem 
is that the core has lower unit costs and net exports whereas the periphery has higher costs and 
trade deficits. Short of a productivity miracle in the periphery, there are two ways that the 
rebalancing can occur: either through inflation and expansion in the core or through deflation 
and contraction in the periphery. The former comes with higher employment and latter with 
unemployment. In the first strategy Germany would have to stimulate demand and increase its 
wages, whereas in the second one Greece would have to dampen demand and decrease wages 
and prices. 
 
The problem of reducing budget deficits has to be seen in the same international context. The 
budget deficit (BD) equals firms‟ saving (SF) plus household saving (SHH)
7 minus the current 
account position (CA).  
 
BD = SF + SHH – CA  
 
This equation does, by itself, not say anything about the direction of causation and indeed 
some authors may use it to argue that excessive government deficits cause current account 
deficits or that labour market inflexibility causes current account deficits that also result in 
budget deficits (e.g. Moschovis and Servera 2010). We will use the equation illustrates the 
difficulties of balancing the economies of the periphery. In doing so, we will make two key 
assumptions: that some country, Germany, is successfully pursuing a policy that results in 
                                                 
7 SF + SHH is is total private net savings, i.e. total private saving less private investment. 14 
current account surpluses. Second, we treat the euro area as closed economy. The first is a 
bold  assumption,  the  main  purpose  of  which  is  to  highlight  the  interdependencies  in  a 
monetary  union.  The  second  is  not  so  much  an  assumption  as  a  crude  approximation  to 
illustrate our point. In fact 57% of Germany‟s net exports are to the Euro area and 54% of 
Greece‟s (negative) net exports are from trade with other Euro members (for 2006 according 
to OECD statistics).
8 In other words, what is going  on within the Euro area is not the entire 
story, but almost literally, more than half of it.  
  
In the past decade, the peripheral countries had current account deficits; therefore either 
public sector or the private sector had to go into a deficit. The degree to which these deficits 
occurred in the private sector or in the public sector varied by country (in Greece, it was the 
public sector, in Spain the private sector), but household savings were relatively low as 
household debt was soaring in all countries. Balancing budgets thus faces  a big challenge: it 
has to be done in a time when household saving rates will increase.   
 
In short, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for peripheral countries to balance their 
books unless there is also a change in the core countries. More specifically, inflation has to be 
substantially higher in the core countries than in the periphery. Just to revert to the relative 
unit labour cost positions of 2000, German inflation would have to exceed inflation in the 
periphery by almost 3%-points a year for an entire decade. Unless one wants to push the 
periphery into a Japan-like deflationary stagnation this can only achieved at EU-wide inflation 
rates well above the ECB‟s inflation target.  
 
The policy implications of this analysis are rather clear: first, wage policy has a critical role in 
the rebalancing of European economies. Simply put, what is needed to save the Euro zone is 
higher wages in Germany! German wages have to grow in excess of productivity growth and 
inflation  for  some  time.  Second,  there  are  direct  implications  for  monetary  policy:  the 
inflation target  has  to  be revised upward such  as  to  allow the core economies  to  exceed 
inflation in the South without pushing the latter into deflation.  
 
6 A suggestion for European wage policy 
                                                 
8 An important, and dynamically growing part of the non-Euro zone trade of Germany is to Central and Eastern 
Europe, to which we have referred to as „new periphery‟ earlier. This is important as part of German wage 
decline is due to offshoring to Central and Eastern Europe (Marin 2010).  15 
 
Wage policy has to ensure rising living standards, an equitable income distribution and a 
sustainable growth process. In the present context this latter requires that wage agreements 
take  into  consideration  their  Europe-wide  effects  and  they  are  consistent  with  an  overall 
growth strategy. This requires the national (or sectoral) wage agreements react to  current 
account positions in a way as to insure a non-deflationary resolution of the imbalances. In 
practise, German (or core) wage would have to rise above productivity and the inflation target 
for  several  years.  Institutionally,  this  requires  a  European  coordination  system  of  wage 
bargaining.   
 
Wage growth (w) in country j would be based on productivity growth (x) of the country, the 
European inflation target (p
T) and it would depend positively on the ULC gap between the EU 
average and the country (Stockhammer 2008). The inflation target would have to be set such 
as to avoid deflation in all countries.   
 
wj = xj + p
T + a(ULCEU – ULCj)  
 
Such a wage policy may sound grossly unrealistic, and, indeed, it may be; however, if the 
Euro is to be saved, it is urgently needed. There may be three principal objections. First, it 
may be argued that wages cannot be influenced by governments but are rather determined by 
markets  (a  related  argument,  often  voiced  by  trade  unionists,  is  that  wages  are  set  in 
autonomous wage bargaining and the state should not interfere with it). But governments have 
always tried to influence wage developments. This has also been the case for the recent past. 
Schulten (2004, Table 10.1) lists no fewer than 29 wage pacts in 12 European countries since 
the  early  1980s.  These  wage  pacts  usually  were  tripartite  arrangements  that  aimed  at 
moderating wage growth in the interest of national competitiveness. What Europe needs now, 
however,  is  wage  pacts  in  the  core  that  aim  at  increasing  wage  growth  and  harm 
competitiveness in the centre. This brings us to the second objection: there is no institutional 
basis for a European coordination of wage agreements. There is much truth in this objection. 
Neither are industrial relations in European countries similar, nor are there indications of the 
emergence of a transnational collective bargaining. This would require active state support. 
But EU treaties, for now, do not support such structures. True; the EU will have to change in 
response to the crisis.  
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Third, there may not be political support for a European collective bargaining system (or even 
for  coordination  across  national  bargaining  across  European  states).  True  enough.  The 
European Commission (as well as the OECD and the IMF) have advocated the dissolution of 
collective  bargaining  arrangements  rather  than  their  extension  to  the  European  level  and 
employer organisation are hostile to the idea. Labour unions are sceptical about losing their 
power  influence  wages.  The  political  obstacles  are  indeed  formidable.  The  system  of 
European collective bargaining, or of a EU-wide coordination of collective bargaining, would 
have  to  be  part  of  a  European  institution  building.  More,  it  would  have  to  come  with  a 
Europeanisation of trade union structures and would form part of a Europeanisation of civil 
society. 
 
We thus reject the objections while acknowledging the obstacles. The existing institutions of 
the EU have served Europe ill. They have led to declining wage shares and to an economic 
growth regime characterized by imbalances and instability. The Greek and Irish crises, in a 
very  profound  sense,  are  a  European  crisis.  Europe  needs  a  fundamental  overhaul  of  its 
institutional structure. It has to recognize that if there is to be an economic and monetary 
integration, it will also have to develop a European fiscal policy (not subject of this paper) and 
a European system of wage bargaining. 
 
7 Reforming economic policy in the EU – where is the Euro area going? 
 
There is little indication that the EU is moving in the direction advocated here (see Larch et al 
2010 as a recent assessment by the European Commission). So what is our assessment of the 
EU policy? Any assessment is difficult as the policies have not always been consistent. 
 
7.1 Fiscal policy 
 
The good news is that, in the early stages of the recession fiscal policy was expansionary 
despite the SGP. While the EC put some pressure on governments to constrain spending, all 
countries allowed budget deficits to increase. However, once the sovereign debt crisis began, 
the EU switched course and pushed for deficit reduction in the periphery. It asked countries to 
abandon the most essential means of economic self defence in times of crisis. Worse still, the 
SGP is to be reformed and, with respect to fiscal policy, tightened. The wrong lessons have 17 
been  learned:  instead  of  expanding  the  (expansionary)  role  of  centralized  fiscal  policy, 
national fiscal policy will be made more restrictive. 
 
7.2 Monetary policy 
 
The record of monetary policy is rather mixed. The ECB reacted swiftly (in summer 2007 as 
well as in summer 2008) to provide liquidity to markets once the crisis began. While the ECB 
reacted  reasonably  responsible  with  respect  to  private  markets,  the  same  is  not  true  for 
governments. It initially put pressure on Greece rather than supporting it. Once the crisis hit, 
it, however, was flexible enough, to bend its rules and accept Greek government bonds. While 
this  was  due  to  its  concern  about  the  stability  of  the  European  banks  rather  than  out  of 
responsibility for European states, it was the right thing to do. Our biggest concern regarding 
monetary policy is about the medium term: there is no indication that the ECB is realizing that 
some parts of Europe will need a lot higher inflation than they have had (and the implications 
for the inflation target); and there is no indication that the ECB is rethinking its trust in 
financial  market  stability:  there  is  no  discussion  of  asset-specific  reserve  requirements  or 
direct credit management despite the obvious failure of market to deliver socially desirable 
outcomes.  
 
The  no  bail  out  clause.  One  of  the  more  positive  developments  is  that  the  EU  has,  if 
hesitantly, effectively acted against the no bail out clause and has created an institution for 
emergencies, the EFSF. The no bail out clause and the absence of any provision for the case 
of a sovereign debt crisis had been naive at best and, not the least under American pressure, 
the EU has put together a special purpose vehicle to finance governments cut off by markets. 
However, the bailout packages the EU is coming up with share the faults of classical IMF 
programmes:  they  rely  on  austerity  measures  to  restore  the  confidence  of  private  capital 
markets,  thus  deepening  the  economic  crisis,  while  being  oblivious  to  the  social  and 
distributional effects of its policy. 
 
7.3 Wage policy 
 
Developments regarding wage policy are among the most depressing. First, in the crisis wage 
are regarded as cost factor rather than as a source of demand. In Greece and Ireland, wage 
cuts are part of the rescue conditionality. Moschovis and Servera (2010) in a publication of 18 
the  European  Commission  recommend  a  weakening  of  collective  bargaining  institutions. 
Second,  Germany  seems  intent  to  proceed  with  its  export-led  growth  model  without 
recognition  of  the  effects  this  has  in  currency  union.  Chancellor  Merkel  has  repeatedly 
defended the German export model and praised it as a role model for other countries. 
 
8 Summary and conclusion  
 
The Euro has long been a political project based on dubious economics. It was born out of the 
emergency of the 1992/93 EMS crisis and the experience of many European countries that 
they  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  German  Bundesbank.  The  Euro  has  been  introduced  with 
different ambitions by different social groups: while Jacques Delors may have regarded it as a 
first step to political unification, the financial sector aimed at establishing a world currency to 
rival the dollar. The European Commission (1990) had defended the Euro on the grounds that 
it would reduce transaction costs, with basically little serious consideration of the costs of 
giving up an independent monetary policy and an exchange rate policy. 
 
The  Euro,  or  more  broadly,  EMU  has  not  delivered.  The  growth  and  employment 
performance of the Euro area has been mediocre and the Euro area institutions have proven 
incapable of preventing the build up of imbalances between as well as within member states. 
While some member states, the core around Germany, have pursued a strategy of export-led 
growth, others, namely the Southern European periphery and Ireland have adopted a credit-
led growth model. The two growth models interact and depend on each other insofar as the 
export-led model presupposes a group of countries running current account deficits and the 
credit-led economies are usually also (next to domestic bubbles in asset and property prices) 
fuelled  by  capital  inflows.  The  crisis  that  erupted  in  2010  in  Europe  is  a  crisis  of  the 
imbalances  that  have  build  up  over  more  than  a  decade  and  of  fragile  private  financial 
institutions revaluating various financial assets including financial debt.  
 
The reaction of economic policy in Europe has been half hearted. It has addressed some 
shortcomings of the economic policy regime of the Euro area, but has shied away from the 
fundamental reforms that are needed. While the ECB has eventually bent its rules to accept 
government papers of its member states as collateral after they have been downgraded by 
markets and the no bailout clause has been circumvented by the establishment of the EFSF, 19 
the bailout programs that have resulted are modelled after standard IMF programs that are 
ignorant to its social and distributional consequences and threaten to deepen the crisis.  
 
The Euro‟s success or failure will eventually be judged at the political level. The economic 
policy  structures  that  underpin  it  have  long  been  criticized  by  Keynesians  and  proofed 
wanting the present crisis. Worse, the crisis is not being used for the fundamental overhaul 
that seems necessary. The bailout programs clearly undermine the European Social Model 
(using  this  term  as  a  summary  for  actually  existing  welfare  states  and  the  social  and 
distributional compromises they are built on). And they do little to protect states and their 
citizens from the pressures of an underregulated financial system that has caused a crisis 
second only to the Depression of the 1930s.  
 
This paper has highlighted the need for a change in the role of wage policy within the EU‟s 
economic policy mix. Wage policy presently is almost synonymous with wage flexibility. 
Wage moderation is seen a way out of economic crisis. While this may work for (small) 
individual countries it is recipe for stagnation if generalized as it neglects the role of wages in 
demand formation. Indeed research indicates that an increase in the wage share in the Euro 
area as a whole has expansionary effects (Stockhammer et al. 2009). So Europe needs wages 
that rise at least with labour productivity in the medium term. They would need to rise above 
productivity growth and inflation in the centre. Second there is need for coordination in wage 
policy. Wage flexibility has proven incapable of preventing long-lasting divergences in the 
levels  of  competitiveness  and  of  current  account  positions  across  Europe.  Simply  put,  if 
Europe wants to avoid crises like the Greek and the Irish crises in the future, it needs higher 
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Table 1. Credit-led and export-led growth the centre and the periphery 
  Credit-led  Export-led 
Centre  US, UK  Germany, Japan 
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Table 2. Increase in household debt (in % GDP) 2000/04 and 2000/08 










Germany   -2.74 
-
11.34  Greece  18.26   
Austria  7.05  7.21  Spain  22.01  32.53 
Netherlands  24.35  29.1  Portugal  14.08  21.31 
      Italy  13.05  18.09 
Euro  (12) 
area   8.96    Ireland  35.07  61.72 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations     
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Table 3. Current account (% GDP), 2007 
 
Germany  3.8  Greece  -8.5 
Austria  1.7  Portugal  -8.9 
Netherlands  5.6  Spain  -5.8 
      Italy  -1.3 
      Ireland  -2.1 
Source: OECD       
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Table 4. Unit labour costs (ULC) 2000-08 
Germany  3%  Greece  26% 
Austria  9%  Spain  30% 
Netherlands  19%  Portugal  24% 
    Italy  27% 
Euro  (12) 
area  16%  Ireland  33% 
Source: AMECO, own calculations 
 
 